Sam's security exploit is relativly minor and should not effect anyone with decent dom0 access rules. We currently use random filenames that are pretty hard to guess and if an un-authorized user were to gain access to the Dom0, you'd probably have bigger issues to deal with. So this really only effects "trusted" dom0 users. The resolution is don't give out dom0 access to untrusted users, which is probably a good idea anyway. The whole purpose of ECP is to abstract resources so you don't have to give that level of access to core system resources. The next release of Enomaly ECP will address this issue.
Here is Sam's Full post.
Enomaly ECP/Enomalism: Insecure temporary file creation vulnerabilities-
All versions of Enomaly ECP/Enomalism use temporary files in an insecure
manner, allowing for symlink and command injection attacks.
2. Impact Information
Enomaly ECP (formerly Enomalism) is management software for virtual machines.
Sam Johnston of Australian Online Solutions reported that enomalism2.sh uses
the /tmp/enomalism2.pid temporary file in an insecure manner.
A local attacker could perform a symlink attack to overwrite arbitrary files
on the system with root privileges, or inject arguments to the 'kill' command
to terminate or send arbitrary signals to any process(es) as root.
a. ln -s /tmp/target /tmp/enomalism2.pid
b. echo "-9 1" > /tmp/enomalism2.pid
Never under estimate the power of a vendetta. Thanks Sam, let me know if there is anything I can do in return.